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ABSTRACT An in vivo biosensor is a technology in development that will assess the
biological activity of cancers to individualise external beam radiotherapy. Inserting
such technology into the human body creates cybernetic organisms; a cyborg that is a
human–machine hybrid. There is a gap in knowledge relating to patient willingness to
allow automated technology to be embedded and to become cyborg. There is little
agreement around what makes a cyborg and less understanding of the variation in the
cyborgisation process. Understanding the viewpoint of possible beneficiaries addresses
such gaps. There are currently three versions of ‘cyborg’ in the literature (i) a critical
feminist STS concept to destabilise power inherent in dualisms, (ii) an extreme version
of the human/machine in science-fiction that emphasises the ‘man’ in human and (iii) a
prediction of internal physiological adaptation required for future space exploration.
Interview study findings with 12 men in remission from prostate cancer show a fourth
version can be used to describe current and future sub-groups of the population;
‘everyday cyborgs’. For the everyday cyborg the masculine cyborg status found in the
fictionalised human–machine related to issues of control of the cancer. This was
preferred to the felt stigmatisation of being a ‘leaker and bleeder’. The willingness to
become cyborg was matched with a having to get used to the everyday cyborg’s
technological adaptations and risks. It is crucial to explore the everyday cyborg’s
sometimes ambivalent viewpoint. The everyday cyborg thus adds the dimension of
participant voice currently missing in existing cyborg literatures and imaginations.
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Introduction: The Development of In vivo Biosensors in a Cyborg Society
. . . basically machines were not self-moving, self-designing, autonomous.
They could not achieve mans’s [sic] dream, only mock it . . . now we are
not so sure. Our machines are disturbingly lively, and we ourselves frighten-
ingly inert. (Haraway, 1991, p. 152)
Deaths from prostate cancer are predicted to exceed that from lung cancer by 2015
(Prior and Waxman, 2000; Scambler, 2009). Prostate cancer is the most common
male cancer in Western societies. In the early stages of the disease, men usually
present to their General Practitioner with urinary symptoms such as frequency,
getting up during the night and a poor flow.
Prostate cancer is diagnosed from the results of a blood test. The ‘prostate-
specific antigen’ (PSA) test measures the level of the antigen in asymptomatic
men. It is thought a raised level of PSA is linked to prostate cancer; however, a
positive result does not conclusively demonstrate it (Faulkner, 2012). Screening
for prostate cancer is controversial in the views of some as,
[T]he PSA test has relatively high false positive and negative rates, prostate
biopsies can miss cancers, and the highly variable nature of prostate cancer
means there is potential for diagnosis of indolent cancers that may never
present as a problem. (Clements et al., 2007, p. 8)
Nevertheless, if a PSA is taken and it is raised, a referral for a prostate biopsy may
be made. From the patient’s point of view then, there are generally no physiologi-
cal symptoms to suggest that cancer may be present. We highlight the importance
of this absence below.
Prostate cancer is an illness that some have suggested affects a masculine iden-
tity through for example, incontinence and impotence caused as a result of both
illness and treatment (Conrad, 2007). Treatment options in the early stage of
the disease when the cancer is localised can include periods of ‘watchful
waiting’ when nothing is done until the disease progresses (Prior and Waxman,
2000). Most men however prefer to ‘do’ something with a treatment option
(Chapple and Ziebland, 2002). Treatment might involve external beam radiother-
apy that uses radiation to kill cancer cells. Quite often some patient’s tumours
demonstrate a resistance to radiotherapy. Many of the indicators of radiation
response are found in the tissue and fluids immediately surrounding the tumour.
The development of biosensors is being undertaken in order to sense when the
tumour is at its most vulnerable1 (Wilson and Gifford, 2005, p. 2389; Begg et al.,
2011). Some have suggested that the monitoring of the tumour could take place
when the patient is at home (Scarantino et al., 2002).2 The ability to supply wire-
less power and communications has already been demonstrated (Johannessen
et al., 2004; Smith et al., 2007). The patient’s treatment can then be scheduled
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to coincide with when the biosensor has indicated that the tumour is at its weakest.
This has several benefits. Targeted radiotherapy is likely to have cost-saving
implications given the optimal scheduling of radiotherapy delivery. It can also
help minimise the side-effects that some patients suffer from such as dry mouth
or mouth ulcers (in the case of head and neck cancers) to frozen shoulders and
heart failures (in the case of breast cancer) (Begg et al., 2011).
A biosensor can be considered an active medical device as it is an instrument,
which together with its software, can be used for diagnostic and therapeutic pur-
poses, relying on a power source other than that generated by the body. The Active
Implantable Medical Devices Directive (1993) (AIMD 90/385/EEC as amended
by 2007/47/EC) defines an active medical implant as:
. . . any active medical device which is intended to be totally or partially
introduced, surgically or medically, in to the human body or by medical
intervention in to a natural orifice, and which is intended to remain after
the procedure.
We present findings that show men recovering from prostate cancer are extremely
willing to have a biosensor inserted; to become cyborgs every day. Furthermore,
participants assumed, indeed wanted, the biosensor to have a longer term function-
ality beyond that originally envisaged. This research speaks to the widening inter-
est in theorising how technology is impacting on embodiment through a process of
‘cyborgisation’ (Gray, 1995a). Our participants did not self-identify as a cyborg.
Yet, as a consequence of being permanently implanted and monitored, a cyborg
status would be created for these men. Importantly, we describe this as creating
an everyday cyborg status; a hybrid of machine and organism living in modern
society.
Originally, the cyborg was used in an article to describe the bodily modifications
required to create a homeostatic feedback system for ‘men’ to survive future space
exploration (Clynes and Kline, 1960). This adaptation would not affect who the men
were; changing neither their identity nor sexuality. The extreme versions depicted
in the science-fiction of the cyborg, of the human–machine for example, are also
generally male but the technology does affect their identity and crucially, their
humanity. The human–machine is generally male, with traits of power, strength
and control. The gendering of the cyborg is dealt with more critically in the
science, technology and innovations studies (STIS) literature (Haraway, 1991;
Hayles, 1995; Gray, 1995a, 2000, 2001, 2011, 2012) and in feminist STS literature
(Penley et al., 1990; Kirkup et al., 1999; Henwood et al., 2001). In this STS litera-
ture, and taking the lead from Haraway (1991), technology is a means in which
boundaries between animals and humans; the physical and the non-physical and
animal–human/machines dissolved.
What the everyday cyborg adds to previous versions then is a recognition that a
willingness to become cyborg is contextually dependent, for example, to avoid
486 G. Haddow et al.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 St
irl
ing
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 0
2:0
8 2
7 J
an
ua
ry
 20
16
 
cancer. The present data suggest that prostate cancer threatens masculinity in a
way that existence as a cyborg that is perceived as liberating and powerful,
which offers action and control, does not. The stigmatisation of being a leaker
and a bleeder for the men in our sample points to a cancer identity that victimises
the patient as a person (Sontag, 1978). This experience influences the willingness
to undergo a process of cyborgisation. But there is also ambivalence about the
experiences of incorporating technology into the body and of becoming cyborg
every day. A willingness to become and be a cyborg is also one that can be
accompanied with ambivalence regarding the experiences of living as a
machine–human. Also missing from previous accounts about space travel, or
science fiction or liberation is a less imaginative concept of the everyday
cyborg that outlines the risks involved in becoming cyborg. Such an account
asks whether a person would want to become cyborg every day. What would
the everyday cyborg say about the cyborgisation process? What would the benefits
and challenges of living with implanted technologies be from an individual’s
viewpoint? For example, with automated technology brings with it risks of mal-
function. And with implanted automation also comes the removal of autonomy
from the individual.
Before outlining the results of the study and how the answers to these questions
were reached, we briefly outline previous cyborg versions and why the term
cyborg is used here. Particular attention is drawn to the reasons why individuals
would want themselves and others to become cyborg, what an everyday cyborg
actually is, and why this status carries with it its own unique risks. Hence, after
outlining the findings we then reflect in the discussion about what the data
might say to the cyborg literature as well as the argument that the process of cybor-
gisation is variable but inevitable at the level of the individual and society more
generally (Gray, 2000).
The Conceptual Work of the Cyborg
The term ‘cyborg’ was originally coined in the 1960s as a term to describe the
mechanical adaptations to the body thought necessary to enable individuals to
live in a hostile environment such as space: ‘For the exogenously extended organ-
izational complex functioning as an integrated homeostatic system unconsciously,
we propose the term “Cyborg”’ (Clynes and Kline, 1960). In the original usage of
the term ‘cybernetic organism’ the cyborgs were referred to as men and how their
bodies could be adapted. For the ‘cyborg-in-space’ it was essential to have an
object, device or process which acted as a reactor so that any changes in the
environment did not damage the internal normal physiological processes essential
for survival. Key then to the original use of the concept is the regulation and sur-
veillance of the body without the person necessarily being aware of it (Clynes and
Kline, 1960 , p. 75). And yet, in Clyne’s original conception of the cyborg, and
others since then, these technological adaptations and implantations to the
Cyborgs in the Everyday 487
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 St
irl
ing
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 0
2:0
8 2
7 J
an
ua
ry
 20
16
 
human body are seen as broadly acceptable, relatively risk-free and largely unpro-
blematic for the person.
More well known is an extreme version of the cyborg. In the public imagination
this cyborg is the science fiction image portrayed in books, films and other cultural
forms (Oetler, 1995). Often these are images of beings who are human–machine
hybrids that are stronger and more powerful, yet incapable of feeling and
emotions. Therefore they are somehow less human and humane. Recent examples,
are the Borg in Star Trek, the Cybermen in Dr Who, and the antagonists in films
such as Robocop and Terminator (Goldberg, 1995). In an interview with Chris
Gray, Clynes expressed horror at what his cyborg-in-space had become in the
science fiction genre, ‘Well at first I was amused and then I was horrified
because it was a total distortion . . . This recent film with this Terminator, with
Schwarzenegger playing this thing-dehumanized the concept completely.’ The
Terminator and others are examples of visible abominations of organic–inorganic
machinations, and crucially, male and thus human–machine with emphasis on the
‘man’ in human.
The science-fiction cyborg is almost always invariably male, or asexual at best.3
This masculinity as well as inhumanity of the fiction cyborg is a trend that can be
traced historically to the ‘creature’ created by a scientist ‘Frankenstein in the
gothic novel by the author Mary Shelley’ (Shelley, 1831 (1993)). In the introduc-
tion to the 1993 reprint, Jansson suggests:
For Mary Shelley, however, two of the most important aspects of science
centre upon the essential ‘masculinity’ of scientific thought . . . This ‘mascu-
linity’ is most evident in the removal of any feminine element from the Crea-
ture’s ‘birth’; the scientific process activated by Victor excluded any sense of
the humanity of the Creature. (p. x)
Although there may be some notable exceptions to the cyborg’s masculine
identity, these human–machines have the physical attributes of strength and
power co-existent with the dominant Western ideals of masculinity (Connell,
1995).4 Gendering of the cyborg does not just prevail in our imaginations of the
science-fiction or even in the ‘cyborg-in-space’ versions but explicitly with the
technological focus and dominance found in war today. In, for example, ‘toys
for the boys’ and in adaptions and control of the male penis for sexual attraction
and intercourse (Gray, 2000). These extreme cyborgs in the imagination can be
contrasted with the ‘mundane cyborg’ (Petersen, 2007; Mentor, 2011), where
differences between the ordinary and the extraordinary arguably reflect questions
of degree and not kind.
Another version of the cyborg emerged in feminist science studies and science
and technology studies (STS). Here the cyborg has been deployed to challenge the
dominance of dualisms inherent in gender for example. The feminist philosopher
and social theorist Donna Haraway, in her seminal paper ‘The Cyborg Manifesto’
488 G. Haddow et al.
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(1991) drew on the ‘cyborg’ to challenge longstanding dualisms between nature
and technology, human and animal, male and female (Haraway, 2003). According
to Haraway, the cyborg is a, ‘cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and organ-
ism, a creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction’ (1991, p. 119). It is
historical and also post-gender with an ability to liberate from classificatory cat-
egories. Not just a phantasm of fiction or the imagination but a ‘reality’ as a
phenomenon that exists. Haraway deploys the cyborg as a positive feminist meta-
phor, a means of not only highlighting, but also, invalidating the inherent impurity
of any dualistic system of thought or mode of being in the world. The cyborg for
Haraway was our ontology and our existence. With technologies such as biosen-
sors, a society of cyborg individuals implanted with technologies is being created.
Furthermore, these everyday cyborgs are increasingly living in an environment
dominated with technological relations of cyborg society. Yet the everyday
cyborg is not necessarily an icon of liberation envisioned by authors, such as
Haraway (1991, 2003) but, as we will show, may be a reflection of current tech-
nological developments and medical practices reifying existing inequalities in
cyborg society.
At the time Haraway published her Cyborg Manifesto in 1985, many people
were already living with technologically augmented bodies for medical therapy.
Over 30 years later, medical technologies that augment and replace human
organs and limbs have improved dramatically. Indeed, STS literature is beginning
to acknowledge the experiential basis of cyborgisation for these patients (Bjorn
and Markussen, 2013; Oudshoorn, 2015). Hayles (1995, p. 322) identifies the
cyborg as existing in the technical sense; as being the 10% of the American
public with ‘electronic pacemakers, artificial joints, drug implant systems,
implanted corneal lenses, and artificial skin’. An even higher percentage, she
sees as living as ‘metaphoric cyborgs’ with a life entwined in an information com-
munication environment. For cyborg scholar Gray, the process of cyborgisation is
akin to that of dying and death both sharing a variability but inevitability:
There are many different types and levels of cyborgization. The incorporated
living elements (viral, bacterial, plant, insect, reptile, rodent, avian,
mammal), the technological interventions (vaccination, machine prosthesis,
genetic engineering, nanobot infection, xenotransplant) and the level of inte-
gration (mini, mega, mundane) can all vary, an infinite number of cyborgs,
life multiplied by human invention and intervention. (2012, 29)
As society becomes invaded with information communication technology so too
has the body itself. Yet the unevenness of this ‘invasion’, charting who it is likely
to affect and why, has not yet been well-documented or understood. Swallowing a
pill or riding a bike does not make someone an everyday cyborg. Clynes suggested
that ‘once you learn how to do these things automatically [ride a bike] the bike
becomes almost a part of you’ (Gray, 1995a, p. 49). He termed this as becoming
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almost virtually a cyborg, but more of ‘a simple cyborg’. Then, to be an everyday
cyborg, modifications are required that quite literally become part of a person and
that are automated and beyond individual autonomy.
Technically, the possibility of creating cyborgs through the insertion of devices
such as biosensors create their own unique challenges relating to the design of the
technology in terms of size, power, accessibility, status and transference of infor-
mation as well as the risks posed to the individual. Converging technologies such
as biosensors can pose a number of problems as they draw upon the technologies
of ‘informatization and miniaturization’ (Swierstra et al., 2009) bringing together
biotechnology, nanotechnology and information technology. In doing so, the conver-
gence may diminish the cogency of each function, creating additional risks not pre-
viously recognised. The biosensor will be able to transmit data about the tumour out
of the body—that is, it will be able to send data to a monitor and a device program-
mer hence bringing into question the need for data security and accuracy.5
Given these challenges what then are the viewpoints of a group of possible ben-
eficiaries, to having such a technology inserted into their bodies? To become
cyborg every day. The cyborgs of extreme science fiction, of life in future
space, or in feminist science studies, do not tackle what we tentatively refer to,
as ‘everyday cyborg’, of individual people willing to live with internal techno-
mechanical modifications. By using the term ‘everyday’ we mean to (1) differen-
tiate those living with technology from the other cyborg models of science-fiction,
outer-space or critical STS and to (2) highlight that the ‘everyday’ is in itself an
achievement and not something we can always take-for-granted (Das, 2010) To
be an everyday cyborg builds on the previous literature about cyborgs (outlined
above) insofar as (1) similar to the ‘in-space’ model, the technology is automated
and implanted and the person may not always be aware of its function and func-
tioning. The everyday cyborg is however (2) not monstrous as in the ‘sci-fiction
portrayal’ but mundane in the everyday; someone who is not inhumane but is actu-
ally very human, (3) the person is a hybrid of physical and virtual convergences
yet, is not an emancipatory political myth nor a positive feminist metaphor, but
is part of a highly gendered biosocial phenomenon and (4) the everyday cyborg
lives with risk and he is not in control of the process of cyborgisation, which is
often created and mediated by experts.
Methods
Recruitment
We analyse the experience of cyborgisation and everyday cyborgs through the study
of men recovering from prostate cancer. We purposively sampled for men based on
their treatment status. As part of their radiotherapy they are fitted with fiducial gold
markers that are inactive but cannot be removed due to the position of the prostate.
This embodied knowledge of having objects implanted for therapeutic purpose and
490 G. Haddow et al.
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then left in the body was thought to produce points of view of the biosensor tech-
nology that was more ‘grounded’ and, importantly, based on actual experience
rather than possible conjecture. This allows us to analyse the experiences of cybor-
gisation in an everyday context. The study recruited post-treatment prostate cancer
patients from a Cancer Centre, at a UK National Health Service (NHS) hospital who
were attending their follow-up clinic with a specialist nurse three months after the
completion of successful external beam radiotherapy treatment. The specialist nurse
approached participants at the review clinic. They explained the study to the partici-
pant giving them the participant information sheet and consent form. They asked for
their consent to pass their contact details (name, e-mail address and telephone
number) on to the social scientists.
Once the researchers received these details we contacted the participants
enquiring about the participants’ continued interest and willingness to participate
and also taking the opportunity to answer any further questions and reminding the
participants that they were under no obligation to participate. If willing to be inter-
viewed, a date, time and location convenient to them was arranged. Our intention
was to interview the participants about their views of the intra tumour biosensor in
light of their experiences of cancer but we did not want them to relive previous
circumstances in an experiential and unduly upsetting manner. None of our par-
ticipants demonstrated any visible distress or tiredness during the interview or
in the wind-down time after. Full ethical clearance was gained from an NHS
MREC (10/S1103/41). In the following accounts pseudonyms are used and care
taken to avoid disclosing exact locations.
Interviews
The interview was semi-structured with the ordering and form of the questions used
flexibly although the main areas of interest were addressed around acceptability, visi-
bility, willingness, control, ownership and information transference. Furthermore, we
used vignettes and pictorial representations of the implants to stimulate discussion.
Permission to record with a digital voice recorder was sought and none refused.
The recordings were anonymised, transcribed and analysed; the latter with the aid
of a computer-aided qualitative data analysis software Nvivo 9 to aid identification
of key themes and to explore when issues were discussed in relation to each other
(and if so, how regularly). These are part of standard qualitative analysis procedures
(Glaser, 1965; Glaser and Strauss, 1967) and we used both an inductive and deduc-
tive approach to thematic development. For example, ‘getting used to’ was an impor-
tant trope that arose in vivo, that is, in participant’s own words.
Sample
Of 15 participants initially contacted, 12 men were interviewed, with 4 carried
out with wives present, occasionally prompting their partner’s recollections or
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adding additional comments.6 Our participants were aged between 62 and 77
years, born between 1935 and 1950. All had been or were married and most,
but not all, had children and grandchildren. Such demographic data provided
context for the study; for example, who else was told about the diagnosis.
The importance of demographics affecting views in a sample of this size
cannot be established. We anticipated that being in recovery from cancer the par-
ticipants might be more likely to offer positive views of the biosensor technol-
ogy. Indeed, this appears to be the case, and was commented on by the
participants themselves. However, we were also struck by the range of ambiva-
lences also voiced, impressing on us that views were not overly determined by
this experience; experience which by necessity we were keen to identify and
include in the first place.
Findings: Everyday Cyborgs
As is often the case, prostate cancer was ‘symptom less’. Participants told us they
had sought advice from their GP regarding other health problems such as not
sleeping (Mr Williams), bladder infection (Mr Dean), deafness (Mr Dubont)
and, ‘that problem of getting up in the night’ (Mr Shane). For many, the cancer
diagnosis came as unexpected: Mr Nairn said, ‘I feel well, I’ve always been
well, even before surgery, after surgery and ever since. There’s only blood tests
suggested I had prostate cancer, so you have to take people’s word for it.’ The
uncertain and asymptomatic nature of the disease, the unpleasantness of pro-
cedures involved in attempting to establish a diagnosis, as well as the perceived
stigmatised position that prostate cancer sufferers occupy in society was commen-
ted upon. Mr Williams, summed it up, at the very beginning of his interview:
I went to the doctor to discuss not sleeping and he said we’d better do a blood
test because we don’t know, and that was that. I really forgot about it and the
next thing I was asked to go to the urology at the hospital. I didn’t phone the
doctor, I just went up there thinking ‘why am I here?’, ‘I’m perfectly fit’. I
cycled over, I sat down and there were all these poor men as I saw them, I
know there are vulgar terms for them, ‘leakers’ and ‘bleeders’ or whatever,
but I didn’t regard myself as part of that at all . . . I remember having an
image of myself being in that room floating above what was going on down
below as I was duly fingered and all the usual sort of things. (Mr Williams,
emphasis added)
With little warning, Mr Williams became a member of the ‘leakers’ and ‘bleeders’
subjected to intrusive tests and procedures. A common treatment for the cancer
was external beam radiotherapy with most participants demonstrating clear under-
standing of the process:
492 G. Haddow et al.
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The preparation for radiotherapy starts with a CT scan to identify, it was
prostate cancer I had/have, and they plant gold [fiducial markers] seeds in
three positions in the prostate and a CT scan identifies where it is so they
can target exactly where it’s going. They put marks on your body so they
can line that up and get the accuracy correct then it homes in on that. All
they do is expose, they put tattoo marks on your body, just a black spot,
which they line up and target the beam on that. (Mr Scot)
Targeted radiotherapy consisted of a few minutes of treatment occurring five days
a week over a period of months. The process was described succinctly by Mr
Melrose as, ‘taking longer to get your stuff off and get on the table [than] to get
the treatment’. As mentioned in the above quotation, ‘gold seeds’ or fiducial
markers are used so that the radiotherapy can be administered with the greatest
possible accuracy. The participants that had received external radiotherapy all
had markers in their bodies. Few admitted hardly ever giving any thought to
them. Jokes were made during the interview about the fact they were made of
gold and their perceived cost. Mr Dalkeith said, ‘ . . . they just told me they
were a couple of wee gold markers and I thought it’s probably the best bit of jew-
ellery I’ve got’. These men may be partly physical/non-physical with their ‘wee
gold markers’. At this point, the men are not yet cyborg in the cyborg-in-space
or cyborg-in-fiction version of the term. Neither do they appear to represent a blur-
ring of Haraway’s (1991) boundaries between the animal–human (organism) and
machine although they are technically hybrid. Control of their physiological pro-
cesses or organs are not yet mechanised, automated nor automatic and they are not
yet human–machine. The conditions which will make the possibility of becoming
a cyborg every day has however been set.
Would You Have One?
We moved from discussing the treatment that was offered to patients to more
‘hypothetical’ scenarios, whereby in vivo biosensors might be offered as a
future option. Few participants had heard the term ‘biosensor’ before. Those
that had could not remember where they might have come across it. Most were
willing to accept the sensor for a variety of reasons including trust in medical
science but mainly influenced by the desire to avoid future cancer:
Mr Burgh: Frankly I do as I’m told. My knowledge of medicine and the likes is virtually
nil, so if the doctor tells me I need something I do it, it’s as simple as that. It’s
in my own interests as well so it’s very likely I wouldn’t have a problem with
it.
GH: Is there absolutely anything at all that we’ve talked about or perhaps not
talked about that would put you off (the in-vivo biosensor) or that you want
to add?
Mr Cole: As I said, I had such a fright I would have gone through anything.
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Cyborgisation is then a process that is variable and contextually dependent
based on the reasons for the technology being implanted. In these cases, cancer
was an important factor. However, the medical professional’s influence was
also key and appears to be uncritically accepted suggesting that the everyday
experience of becoming cyborgs is mediated by experts. Willingness to incorpor-
ate technologically advanced and automated electrical parts is not a decision the
individual would freely take. It is one that the everyday cyborg may have to
accept.
More Than Planned
It became apparent in interviews that some of the participants assumed the biosen-
sors could be a continual part of their recovery. A cyborg status, if embraced, was
not seen as temporary one but would remain a permanent feature of their life. That
is, biosensors would continually monitor the prostate, not just at a time when
radiotherapy would be given, but also as a long-term warning system. The biosen-
sor is the technological adaptation, the feedback mechanism envisaged by Clynes
and Kline (1960) in their ‘cyborg-in-space’ version, surveying the body automati-
cally without the person ever being aware of it. Although it is unclear whether the
adaptions for space exploration would be permanent, for cancer protection and the
everyday cyborg it was. Mr Williams continued:
. . . if I had a bio-sensor in me and there was no-one could read it I wouldn’t
fuss about whether I could turn it on or off or not. For me these are irrelevant
questions, it’s the concept of, right from the beginning, if I’d been asked, we
might want to put a bio-sensor into your body and it might just have to stay
there forever and it might only work for six months, would that be alright or
would you be happier, obviously you would be happier with one that worked
forever. It seems to me that would be a, the concept of it not working hadn’t
occurred to me . . .
Hence, as we went onto discuss in the interviews, ethical questions around data
security were felt generally to be ‘irrelevant’ for the everyday cyborg. Reiterating
positive views about the technology, and the professionals involved, Mr Cole had
a laissez-faire attitude to data sharing, ‘I feel if you’re being treated then so long as
it’s the professionals involved in it, I don’t give a monkeys who knows.’ The
ability for the biosensor to transmit data from the prostate to an external
monitor about the receptivity of the tumour to external beam therapy was rela-
tively well received over all.
For some participants in the current sample what appeared more important, than
data security was it (the biosensor) ‘working forever’. This ‘forever functionality’
would be welcome, as Mr Scot suggested; ‘I would think that’s right because if
you think of the PSA, which is a blood test, if the PSA can be monitored by a
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biosensor then that’s a big step forward.’ Mr Shane went further. He suggested that
those who had cancer ‘in the family’ could be offered biosensors:
This possibly could be given to people who have a history of, because I think
it’s genetic, I think there’s a lot, I’m sure they know that if you have a father
or brother, anybody that could be given this device then presumably this
could be monitored that way rather than the biopsy before it gets to the
stage when you have to get a biopsy.
In this account, the everyday cyborg is now far removed from the abstract
concept of a critical STIS cyborg (Haraway, 1991). Although the cyborg modi-
fications are liberating in that there is a form of surveillance and protection from
cancer it is constraining insofar as it is only preferable to the cancer patient
alternative. Furthermore, this hybridity is not emancipatory of the power in
the dualisms that so often mark contemporary society. The cyborg is a family
man and he is vulnerable to the recurrence of disease and humane in his dealings
with significant others. The everyday cyborg is not then science-fiction’s
monster and although he is male, he advocates an interesting version of
‘cyborg creep’. In current accounts, everyday cyborgs embrace promissory tech-
nologies protecting their own bodies but also the bodies of those important to
them. Everyday cyborgs care.
Such long term and extended surveillance of the prostate by biosensing is not an
intended functionality of the biosensor as currently envisaged by developers. A
possible drug delivery system is being discussed however, and this was well
received by the participants, again tying in with the regulation aspect of Clynes
and Kline (1960) original cyborg-in-space model. Everyday cyborgs therefore
would benefit from further convergences in the technology that would not only
sense but maintain the physiological status through a feedback mechanism react-
ing to change. This type of automation enhances the health of the everyday cyborg
freeing the individual from having to, for example, give themselves daily injec-
tions. It is not so dissimilar from the sci-fi human–machines who benefit from
automated functioning (Goldberg, 1995; Gray, 1995a). The everyday cyborg
benefits also and would hardly be aware of the drug being delivered. Their hybrid-
ity is both active and quiet:
GH: You might want to use it to deliver a drug as well.
Mr Williams: That would be a good thing. I’ve got a friend who is diabetic and if he was
given something that was implanted, however crudely on his body, rather
than having to jab the thing every day, he would go for it, so it’s all very
detail-specific.
EK: If it was going to release a drug, would you prefer it if the doctors could tell
it when to release drugs or that the bio-sensor would be smart enough to do
it when it thinks it needs to?
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Mr Lamb: If it’s been made by doctors who know what they’re doing the probability
is that the bio-sensor is smart enough to know when to release it so,
whatever.
Cyborgisation of the body, produced through the insertion of automation, is
mediated through the medical system and embraced by the participants. Becoming
cyborg is not seen as becoming monstrous as in the science-fiction version (Gray,
1995b). Although hybrid, the hybridity is a necessity for the everyday cyborg. In a
sense, it is not that far removed from future space-travel (Clynes and Kline, 1960).
But for Mr Lamb, there were additional risks to having automated treatments such
as a drug release system in the body needed in order to survive:
I think you’d have to make the assumption that whatever was contained
within the thing was almost certainly going to be used. Because if suddenly
they said, gosh, the tumour has died, we don’t need to release this, do you
mind spending the rest of your life with this extraordinary drug in your
body that might leak out? (Mr Lamb)
Some participants were simultaneously incredulous and apprehensive about the
unintended consequences of automated drug delivery:
I think we’re getting into the realms of the science fiction now. If the thing
could administer drugs, which is another great idea, but when would it know
it was giving the right drug at the right time? And also if, say for example,
after getting so much of the drug and the tumour changed, would the same
drug have a detrimental effect on it or would you think that you’re putting
this thing in and you’re leaving it to do the work of what you would say
the oncologist, or would you have to keep monitoring it in MRI scans?
(Mr Melrose; emphasis added)
Cyborgisation is risky for the individual. More commonly, contraceptive implants
for women are regularly used in the UK and can be inserted in the upper arm
slowly releasing progesterone. Contraceptive implants can be removed and their
malfunctioning, as technology is wont to do, may not have fatal consequences.
If the biosensor malfunctions or if the drug leaks then the repercussions are far
more likely to be significant in terms of having a negative impact on the everyday
cyborg’s health. For the everyday cyborg automated medicine is one aspect of
convergence functioning that may carry additional benefits regarding ability to
survive in a hostile environment whether it be in space or with cancer.
However, further and increasing convergences of technology, especially of auto-
mated treatment, carries risks not commented on previously. Neither the in-space
cyborg (Kline and Clynes, 1960) nor the feminist science studies literature
(Haraway, 1991) discusses the possibility of the technology malfunctioning
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when it is in control. Haraway (1991) famously suggested she might rather be a
cyborg than a goddess but the former may come with hidden costs. The cyborg
is technology in the body; a hybrid indeed but both these two entities remain mate-
rially intact. The signification of the cyborg is different to its materialisation
granted but being a cyborg can be detrimental to your health.
Risks: Space and Time and is It Mine?
As discussed above, Mr Melrose was suspicious of the automated treatment poten-
tial of biosensors as with automation there is the risk of malfunction. Yet Mr
Melrose had a laissez-faire attitude to the removal of the sensor as long as it
was not having any detrimental effects. He suggested that leaving the device in:
It wouldn’t worry me if it [bio-sensor] couldn’t be removed and it wasn’t
going to be causing any after-effects, fair enough, that would be alright,
there’s no problem there. Because after all they’re putting these markers
in and they’re leaving them.
Likewise, Mr Burgh, ‘The seeds are going to be there anyway, so keep that
company’. The biosensors are artificial in form as are the fiducial marker seeds.
The former however have an additional active functionality understood by the
participants.
Then the everyday cyborg is not a simple cyborg insofar as it was defined by
Clynes in his interview with Gray (1995b, p. 40). Although Clynes suggested
that when the person is able to automatically accomplish tasks such as riding a
bike that technology virtually makes them a simple cyborg (1995, p. 49) the
bicycle does not actually become a part of the everyday cyborg in the way that
an implanted machine quite literally does. Taking a pill may mean a temporary
addition to the body but it does not become permanent part of the body in the
way a device does; it is not an automated permanent fixture for example. Indeed,
Mr Shaver said ‘If it [biosensor] did its job it would be part of me’. As alien in
matter as the technology is, it can become acclimatised to and incorporated into
the organic body. The cyborg’s technological adaptations are felt then to be no
different to their (non) awareness of other organs. The everyday cyborg becomes
a hybrid of the organic-mechanical. And this hybridity is not extra-ordinary or mon-
strous but becomes ordinary and mundane. A person cannot physically touch inside
their own body handling the major organs, and indeed the organs themselves may be
(or become) alien to the person.7 In the same way as we do not own our organs most
participants asked felt that they did not have ownership of the biosensor. It was felt
to belong to the UK NHS. Parallels were drawn with other implantable medical
technologies such as cardiac pacemakers:
Mr Melrose: Before it’s in your body then obviously it belongs to the National Health
Service.
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GH: When it’s in your body?
Mr Melrose: I would still think it belongs to them, although it’s in your body it’s only
there to help you get better hopefully.
GH: What about when it’s no longer working and it’s still in your body?
Mr Melrose: If it’s no longer working and they can’t take it out then fair enough. But if
it’s in there to stay then it’s in there to stay, you’ve got something of the
National Health Services.
GH: Would you not feel it’s yours?
Mr Melrose: When you say it’s yours there’s nothing you can do with it. It’s not as though
you can take it out and play with it or sell it. It’s no advantage other than the
thing is in you. It’s like having a pacemaker, they put the pacemaker in you
and it’s in there while you’re alive but once you die they’ve got to take that
out (emphasis added).
Given the participants did not feel that they owned the sensor but it was part of
them in the same way their own organs might be part of them, we wondered
whether control would be an important aspect for them—an area touched on
above but warranting further exploration. The biosensor, as a mechanical
device, would be controllable by others, by experts, in a way that human organs
are not for example.
The reason why researching people’s views of implantable medical technol-
ogies is important, is because of the intimacy of the machine in relation to the cor-
poreal. Ironically, this bodily intimacy also implies distance in terms of personal
control. Being implanted with automated technology has detrimental conse-
quences in terms of control and autonomy for the everyday cyborg. Nowhere
does this seem to appear in alternative versions and models of the cyborg. With
implantable devices although they may in some respects become parts of the
body, as unknowable to the person as their other organs, the implants still maintain
a connection to others. The biosensor belongs to the NHS. The implications of this
ownership and, importantly, control by others for the cyborg in science-fiction
have been explored (Goldberg, 1995, p. 233) however not for any of the other ver-
sions and certainly not, until now, for the everyday cyborg.
Given the possible risks associated with automated drug delivery for example,
several control options were offered regarding whether the biosensor could be
switched on or off (e.g. by the patient or a medical professional). By far the
most popular response was for the sensor to have automatic control functioning
similar in the way that internal organs function. Part of the reason related to
patients’ unwillingness to take ‘the controls’ of the biosensor was you could
‘forget’ it (Mr Melrose) or bemusement, ‘why would I, as a patient, be wanting
to switch it on and off?’ (Mr Nairn) and finally, to not having to explain the
sensor to people. Mr Shaver explained:
I just think it would be better all-round, better for me not having to carry
something around or lose it or explain it to people. I didn’t tell the family
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I had prostate cancer until I started my treatment because I didn’t want the
kids, the young ones, looking at me differently, and I didn’t want them all
crying on me, so I bit the bullet and got a telling-off later on. (emphasis
added)
Contrast this unwillingness to take personal control of the sensor with a discussion
with Mr Cole about whether members of the general public would be willing to
have a biosensor:
Mr Cole: . . . Although a lot of people might say ‘I don’t want to walk about
with something stuck in me’, I think that would be an issue for some folk. For
me, quite a long list of folk that I’ve known who have died of cancer, any-
thing to avoid that, so I would put up with that but a lot of folk might think, ‘I
don’t want somebody else controlling my bits and pieces’. That could well
be an issue. (emphasis added)
Unwillingness to take personal control of the device compared with unwillingness
to allow others to control the biosensor suggests autonomy is heavily context
dependent on the device functions and functioning. It is importantly variable in
the process of cyborgisation at the individual and societal level. Put simply, in
terms of machines and technology working inside the body, who is controlling
what, for whom and why?
Why Take the Risks in Cyborgisation?
Risk is contextually dependent on issues of control but views of it are affected by
whether there is felt to be a need to take the risk. Any type of invasive surgery
brings with it the risk of additional traumas that can range in the severity of con-
sequences. The chances of the biosensor causing the patient damage through
infection on implantation, to blood clotting or embolism is a possibility, although
slim ones. We discussed these risks with all participants and whether this would
change their views about biosensor acceptability. Whereas the risk of infection
was seen as acceptable it was not the case when it came to discussing possible
fatalities from embolisms.
Made explicit in some accounts was a ‘weighing up’, of the possibility of a
fatality from the biosensor against the severity of the cancer. For Mr Nairn,
[T]hat is a more difficult one to answer because I find myself in the situation
that I’m quite well at the moment. Prostate cancer as far as I’m aware can
progress slowly therefore I might prefer to delay something with a risk
until a time that is, where the need is more pressing.
Mr Shaver linked it to his age saying he, ‘would accept it [the risk of embolism] if
I was this age, yes. I wouldn’t like it maybe but I’d accept it’. Iatrogenic effects of
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a cyborg adaption were assessed in relation to the severity of the cancer and the
age of the person (Conrad, 2007). Technology, control and risk perceptions are
weighed up in terms of costs and benefits—How old am I? How sick am I? Am
I worth it? If I am worth it, is the device worth the risk?
Generally the process of cyborgisation was worth the risk. The most salient
feature of all the interviews in the current research was the context of the partici-
pants having survived cancer. The impact that this had on the views in relation to
the discussion of biosensors cannot be understated or ignored and is a key factor
influencing positive attitudes. As Mr Nairn put it at the end of his interview:
Again it comes back to the fact that any medical treatment comes with a risk
and it’s a case of balancing risks, and with cancer the risk of the disease is
worse than the risk of what could go wrong’ [And much later] ‘I’m intrigued
by you actually need to speak to people about it because I would have
thought people would be willing to try anything if it might reduce the
threat. (emphasis added)
Such sentiments fuel discussions around the robustness of consent both as a prac-
tice and value and points to the importance of examining the motivations of par-
ticipation and the social context in which views are expressed. Access by others to
the biosensor and of possible infections caused by its presence are risks for the
everyday cyborg they are prepared to take. They live in the shadow of cancer
and there is a universal willingness to ‘try anything’.
Yet, in this case, to have a biosensor implanted and to become cyborg in the
everyday was not whole-heartedly embraced. It was one thing to be willing to
be implanted but it was another to live with it. The stoicism found in the discourse
of acceptance emerged as a theme relating to a ‘getting used to’ trope.8 When con-
sidering, for example, the scenario whether the implant might need to break
through the skin barrier in order to access an external power source, this initially
provoked negativity from the participants.
The visibility of the adaption by breaking through the skin barrier, was the least
liked aspect of having a biosensor implanted. This poses questions about cyborg
identification by self and others and is worth exploring further. Is it because the
internal adaption can be seen? One can see that there is something inside in a
way that an internal organ cannot? Yet, this discomfort with having wires
through the skin, was also often accompanied alongside a ‘getting used to’ state-
ment. Mr Cole ‘I had a catheter in for months and you get used to that, I think
you would probably get used to it [having visible wires]. Again, if you’ve got
cancer I think I would put up with anything.’ For the everyday cyborg it is preferable
for what goes on inside with their biosensor to stay inside. Perhaps to some extent,
this echoes the visible cyborg identity that the science-fiction model presents (Gold-
berg, 1995). The science-fiction cyborg’s modifications are visible and their inhu-
manness therefore readily apparent; for the everyday cyborg such close associations
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with the monstrous are not welcomed. They are not inhumane, on the contrary, their
everyday status makes them even more humane. Associations with the science-
fiction cyborg are visible when wires are coming through the human skin reminding
the everyday cyborg of their hybridity. And yet, is something else the everyday
cyborg can get used to. As Mr Scot suggested ‘Put it this way, if having a biosensor
with wires poking out through my skin for a limited period of time it was going to do
me good, I would have it’. Mr Nairn commented, ‘It’s the difference between what I
would like and what I will accept’. Mr Dean saw it as,
I think anything that’s going to help you in a situation like that is very accep-
table, and it’s only for, in my case it was seven weeks. It’s not the end of the
world is it, if it’s actually doing good or helping. (emphasis added)
Indeed, evident in most interviews was a view summed up my Mr Lamb’s
response, when asked whether it would have troubled him if he had needed bra-
chytherapy. ‘When you get cancer anything’s better than death’ he said.
Conclusion
In this paper various versions of cyborgs are discussed. The cyborgs in popular
imagination abound in literature and in the media (in-space and in-fiction) and
are versions which emphasise masculinity and traits such as power, strength and
control. Such traits are not shared by the everyday cyborg who may be male, as
in the science-fiction model, but was often a family man. His cyborg presence
in the everyday is one that can present risks to him but are set against the back-
ground of life itself. Willingness to becoming cyborg, living with technological
adaptations that protect his body and the bodies of others, has more appeal than
the lack of control over bodily functions that having prostate cancer, or perhaps
any cancer has. It is preferred even when he has no autonomy over the automated
device that others, such as experts, might have. And when they have data about his
physiology.
It is not clear however whether the willingness to become cyborg was related
specifically to having had cancer which was often mentioned, or whether it was
having recovered from prostate cancer specifically. The latter is a form of
cancer that threatens masculinity both in terms of its consequences and treatment.
It is difficult to say whether the stoicism that was expressed in living as an every-
day cyborg was related to this as being a possibly negative alternative.
The experience of cyborgisation was tempered with reflections of what living
with technological adaptations would mean. Specific risks around technological
malfunction were mentioned and biosensors were internal adaptions that were
balanced against other risks, ‘When you get cancer anything’s better than
death’. Hence, the importance and frequency of ‘getting used to it’. The term
‘getting used to’ is commonly used in the English language describing the
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process of becoming familiar or accustomed with. This might be a process of
acclimatisation that is particularly gendered. It is a stoicism certainly in this
research relating to men supposedly having superior strength and power to
carry on in the light of adversity.
There is the opportunity to explore from the point of view of beneficiaries what
becoming cyborg means for them in terms of the benefits and challenges to their
existence as embodied individuals. A cyborg ontology, as espoused by critical
feminist studies, requires a method of social enquiry that reaches into the experi-
ential and relational, enquiring about the viewpoint of possible beneficiaries. One
such account is given here that focuses on the material repercussions of the cybor-
gisation process. Or rather the personal effects of living as cyborg in the everyday.
Other research is required for recipients who have medical devices such as implan-
table cardiac defibrillators and, interestingly, who also tend to be male (Cunning-
ham et al., 2011). Comparative research on biosensors with women who are
recovering from breast cancer, would further increase understanding of the gen-
dering of willingness to become cyborg and the ambivalence and stoicism that
may follow. This may be the case regarding the ambivalence around the need
for ‘acclimatisation’ when technology is inserted into specific bodily locations
associated with a male or female sexuality identity.
The internal modification of the human body through technologies, such as bio-
sensors, is akin to the regulative and surveillance implants in the original cyborg-
in-space insofar as becoming cyborg is about the technological automation of
human physiological processes and organs. The implantable machines have a
level of functionality and autonomy. Technologies such as implantable cardiac
defibrillators and pacemakers, cochlear implants and deep brain stimulators, are
contributing to a society of cyborgs. More of us will live as everyday cyborgs,
because as we live longer the quality and quantity of implantable technologies
that repair or replace the functions of the body will become increasingly
common. This is at the same time as the ability of the cyborg adaptations
become increasingly sophisticated. Ironically, the more intimate these technologi-
cal automatic adaptations are to the inside of the body resulting in the cyborg—the
more the autonomy of the cyborg is challenged. The biosensor, in some cases,
becomes a part of the person in a similar way that a human organ does; both
unknowable. Yet it is a technology that can malfunction. It has also been
created and man-made. One that can be controlled by experts in a way that a
person’s organ may not be.
What the everyday cyborg adds to previous versions then is a recognition that a
willingness to become cyborg is contextually dependent, for example, to avoid
cancer. The present data suggest that prostate cancer threatens masculinity in a
way that existence as a cyborg that can be liberating and powerful, insofar as stig-
matisation of being a leaker and a bleeder for the men in this sample, is avoided
(Sontag, 1978). This experience influences the willingness to undergo cyborgisa-
tion. But there is also ambivalence about the experiences of incorporating
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technology into the body and of becoming cyborg. A willingness to become
cyborg is also one that can be accompanied with ambivalence regarding the
experiences of living as a machine–human hybrid. Missing from previous
accounts about the cyborg in future space travel, or in science fiction and public
imaginations or liberations from the power dualisms in feminist science studies,
is a less imaginative concept of the everyday cyborg. And yet answering ques-
tions, for example, about whether a person would want to become cyborg
points to the challenges of having to deal with a hybridity that might compromise
personal autonomy. Despite not wanting to take controls of the biosensor partici-
pants are aware of the risk of the biosensor being out of control. Ironically, a
reason for becoming cyborg in this sample, was to overcome a lack of control
over malfunctioning organic body processes.
Creating different types of cyborgs—machines in the human—poses different
types of risks to the individual dependent on the functioning of the technology.
Or rather, dependent on the malfunctioning of the technology. Increasing the
number of cyborgs in society also carries with it challenges. How the actual tech-
nology itself is socially stratified in the population and whether some groups are
more likely (or not) to become, everyday cyborg is key. Liberation does not come
without a cost both at the individual and social level. Where does this challenge re-
situate the cyborg in the feminist science studies literature? The implications of
this research are that the creation of everyday cyborgs is reifying existing
gender stereotypes and inequalities because the dualisms of technology and
human remain in the hybridity that is the everyday cyborg.
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Notes
1Radiation therapy is required for the treatment of over 50% of patients with cancer and has been
argued by some to be highly effective in reducing deaths Delaney et al. (2005, pp. 1129–1137).
2Indeed, technologies such as heart pacemakers or implantable cardiac devices can transmit data
about the condition of the heart from within the patient’s body to a monitor that the patient keeps
at home. The monitor then transmits the data to a central repository at the clinic or hospital that
health professionals can access via a secure intranet Halperin et al. (2008, pp. 30–39).
3The exception in popular media, it could be argued, is the overtly sexualised female cyborg
whose technological modifications focus on female traits such as the ability to listen or
female reproductive anatomy (Six Million Dollar Woman and Seven of Nine in Star Trek).
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4The modern cyborg can be a male soldier with a power masculinised and militarised for a tech-
nological war. The male reproductive organ, the embodiment of masculinity has been the
subject of technological interventions ensuring that control over its functioning can be depended
upon (quoted in Gray, 2000).
5For example, pacemakers and ICDs can malfunction and send data that is erroneous Halperin
et al. (2008, pp. 30–39), Gould et al. (2006, pp. 1907–1911). Halperin and colleagues were
able to access private information and interfere with the integrity of an implantable cardiac defi-
brillator for example Halperin et al. (2008, pp. 30–39).
6Of the three that did not take part this was due to inability to re-contact one, another did not feel
fully recovered and the last did not want to take part.
7For an interesting discussion of how cancer tumours can themselves be seen as ‘alien’ see
Dixon-Woods (2007).
8In Fujita et al. (2006) study of hip replacements patient’s reported a period of having to ‘get
used’ to their hip replacement, often due to the differences in the environment between home
and hospital (e.g. no hand rails). Some reported the effects of the hip on their body perception,
feeling that they did not like having something artificial inside them. Others also reported a
sense of loss about their original hip and even though it did not work properly it was still
‘theirs’ Fujita et al. (2006, pp. 81–87).
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